View Full Version : what is BVR, LOOK DOWN n SHOOT DOWN capabilties
April 13th, 2002, 05:07 AM
in modern fighter aircrafts we come across terms like BVR(beyond visual range) capability or look down ..shoot down capabilityand even fire n forget weapons...does anyone here knoes details abt. it n how much effectve they r against ECM's (electronics counter mesausure)..chaffs n flare decoys?? :confused:
April 13th, 2002, 07:09 AM
BVR=beyond visual range. Means, the pilot is able to track the enemy plane even if it is not visible using on board radar, target it and then fire a missile. Fire and forget weapons are the ones that can seek the target without anymore guidance from the pilot even if the target is moving. It seeks either the heat from the exhaust or has a radar that helps it home in on the target by tracking it using radar inputs and cross checking it with its own position using a GPS mounted on the missile . I will try to get you more informaiton on it on monday. Look down shoot down capability allows a fighter plane to not only look horizontally but vertically and it also can shoot a plane that is flying low and trying to avoid ground based radar.
April 13th, 2002, 11:57 AM
Typical AAM missiles have a range between 8 to 50km. BVR means extending the range of these missiles to almost 100-120km. Technically speaking its almost impossible for a pilot to see an incoming aircraft 40miles away, so i dont know why AMRAAM et all also can't be a form of a BVR missile.
Many new missiles like the AA-10/Alamo are far more superior than the US Sidewinder or Amraam missiles for this same reason. India is also developing its BVR AAM called ASTRA.
Speed - Mach 4
Range - 120KM
Guidance - IR
Speed - Mach 1.2
Range - 40km
Guidance - Active Radar
This is one fo the reasons for the F-22, the US is said to be working on a new generation of AAM. All the Indian Mig-29s and SU-30s are equiped with the AA-10s. And these puki pakis on their forum compare there missiles better
April 14th, 2002, 04:11 AM
New-generation aircraft such as the Gripen, Rafale, Typhoon and F-22 are in service now or under test. Most attention is naturally focused on airframe-related advances - stealth, supersonic maneuverability and so on - but it is smaller, often overlooked details that may bring about a revolution in air combat and bring about some of the most important changes since the advent of the missile-armed supersonic fighter in the 1960s.
Within 10 years, many in-service fighters will be armed with new and much more lethal air-to-air missiles (AAMs). They will be carrying more advanced radars and other technologies which make it much less difficult to declare a target as hostile well beyond visual range. They will also be operating with tactical datalinks which allow several aircraft to share tactical information in a manner which is simply impossible for most aircraft today. Individual and formation tactics will change - but the implications of new technology are such that nobody knows exactly how that will happen.
AAM technology defines the depth of the air battle. "Whoever has the longest reach controls the engagement," comments fighter analyst Ben Lambeth of the Rand Corporation. Lambeth recalls flying on a mock engagement in 1996, a four-versus-four out of Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. F-15s armed with the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range AAM (AMRAAM) took on four F-15s simulating MiG-29s armed with R-27 Alamo MRAAMs and R-73 Archer SRAAMs. "I never had a tally on any of the bad guys. I rarely saw our wingman. We never put more than 3g on the airplane and we never got inverted. There were missiles and people dying everywhere."
This result reflects today's level of technology, in which the within visual range (WVR) and beyond visual range (BVR) envelopes are separate. A BAE Systems paper from 1996 - reflecting the UK thinking that led to the adoption of the BAE Systems Meteor AAM for the Typhoon - points out that a target beyond 40km range "can feel free to maneuver without fear of engagement". This is echoed by Robert Shaw, former US Navy fighter pilot and author of Fighter Combat Tactics. "There is virtually no missile that you can't outmaneuver at maximum range."
With today's weapons, the BAE paper notes, most MRAAM engagements will take place between 15km and 40km-range. Older short-range AAMs "lack not only total energy but also missile speed" and are most lethal at ranges under 8km, according to BAE. Between 8km and 15km, therefore, there is a 'commit' zone where the target can still avoid a merge into close combat if the odds are unfavorable.
The key to the next generation of MRAAMs, such as Meteor, is greater range and (more importantly) greater energy at range. The result is a much larger "no-escape zone". This zone surrounds a target and defines the maximum range at which the target cannot out-maneuver a missile shot. The missile's kill probability may be almost constant from its minimum range out to 80km. (One issue here, observes Shaw, is that it may be difficult to confirm that the missile has found its target, particularly in poor visibility: this may be one reason why Meteor has a two-way datalink.)
Boeing has joined the Meteor program with the intention of marketing the missile in the US. The situation is complicated by the fact that the F-22 needs it less than other fighters. Earlier this year, F-22 chief test pilot Paul Metz confirmed that the F-22's speed and altitude capability acts as a booster stage for the common-or-garden AMRAAM. At M1.5 and at greater altitude than the target (the F-22 has a very fast climb rate and a service ceiling well above 50,000ft), AMRAAM's range is 50% greater than is the case in a subsonic, same-altitude launch.
New SRAAMs are faster than the AIM-9 (due to larger motors or smaller wings) and have new infrared (IR) dome materials which do not blind the seeker when they are heated by air friction. With imaging infrared (IIR) seekers, they are just as effective against a non-afterburning target as against a full-reheat target. Under some circumstances, a modern SRAAM is a BVR missile, capable of being cued on to the target by aircraft sensors and locking on to it at an extreme range of 12-20km. "You can expect to be engaged from about 80km inbound and enter a [MRAAM] no-escape zone shortly thereafter," notes the BAE paper. The commit decision must be made sooner and, if the target pilot commits, the target will enter an SRAAM no-escape zone.
Once the fighters 'merge' - that is, their momentum takes them within SRAAM range of each other, so that the first fighter to attempt to escape will offer his opponent an open tail-on shot - improved SRAAMs and helmet-mounted display (HMD) technology multiply the opportunities for WVR shots. It is no longer necessary to point the aircraft towards the adversary; any target within the field of regard of the missile seeker can be engaged instantly.
According to one source, US Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornets from the Balkans theater recently engaged in mock combat with Israeli Air Force fighters. The Hornets were armed with AIM-9s, and the Israeli fighters carried Python 3 and Python 4 missiles and Elbit DASH helmet sights. IDR's source describes the results as "more than ugly", the Israelis prevailing in 220 out of 240 engagements.
There are lessons to be learned from this engagement and other tests which have shown similar results. One is that modern HMDs and SRAAMs are essential. A second lesson is that WVR combat is extremely dangerous and will become more so. "We'll see less dogfighting once we get the ability to engage targets 90º off the nose," says Shaw. "Somebody's going to get a shot, and if the missile is lethal you're going to get hit." Even the recent history of engagements suggests that the 'furball' of fighter combat, with multiple engagements spread across miles of sky, is on its way out. "We don't see a history of high-g maneuvering in recent engagements," says one industry analyst. "It's fun to practice but unwise to pursue."
A third lesson is that WVR is an equalizer. "An F-5 or a MiG-21 with a high-off-boresight missile and HMD is as capable in a 1-v-1 as an F-22," comments a former navy fighter pilot, now a civilian program manager. "In visual combat, everybody dies at the same rate," says RAND's Lambeth. Indeed, he says that a larger fighter like the F-22 may be at a disadvantage. In the early 1980s force-on-force exercises at the navy's Top Gun fighter school, F-14s were routinely seen and shot down by smaller F-5s flown by the navy's Aggressor units. An F-22 which slows down to enter a WVR combat also gives up the advantage of supersonic maneuverability.
Close range confrontation
Nevertheless, the experts consulted by IDR agreed that the fighter still needs to have the ability to fight at close range - including having a gun. The current state of the debate on this highly controversial piece of equipment is that the F-22 has a gun - indeed, its M61A2 installation, complete with a neat power-actuated door over the muzzle, is one of the most complex ever seen - as does the US Air Force (USAF) version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The US Navy (USN) had apparentlyy decided at one point to forgo the gun on the JSF - which is primarily intended as a deep-strike aircraft - but Boeing program managers now say that there is an "ongoing debate" on the subject. The marines, concerned about vertical landing weight, have settled on a 'missionized' gun, installed in a package that replaces an internal bomb station. Both JSF competitors have selected a Boeing-developed version of the Mauser BK 27mm cannon, fitted with a linkless feed system by Western Design. The UK Royal Air Force has considered eliminating the gun from its second tranche of Typhoons, not so much to save weight as to eliminate training and support costs.
April 14th, 2002, 04:25 AM
my point is that if i'em flying an aircraft and someone launches a BVR AAM at me..and if my radar can detect is 50kms in advance (normal range)..then obviously i get more time to dodge the missile n use my ECM's n chaff n flares decoys easily as compared to a dog-fight scenario...so whatz the real advantage in using them..also it needs the use of AWACS to carry out such activities bcoz on-board radars cannot detect such distances and atleast these weapons need totravel some distance actively (with help ofaircraft or AWACS) before they can zero-in to enemy's fighter signatures such as heat, commn. frequency
it will be crazy to quote this but i've got a copy of USNF'97 flight simulator game wherein i ken simulate an F-18 with AIM-120 AMRAAM...and i c it very easy to dodge a BVR using my instrument panels...and a timely manouver n deplyment of chaff (not flare) do the rest for me...also to launch a BVR AAM i need assistance of AWACS for active-homing of missile bcoz i cant c my targets more that 35-40 nm from my aircraft.. :(
April 14th, 2002, 09:54 AM
Most of the new pulse doppler radars on the new generation aircrafts have a tracking range of almost or more than 100km. Therefore you dont need AWACS to use BVR AAM.
Secondly, i dont know much about what is in the game, but Chaffs and Flares will be usefull only in close combat with heat seeking missiles, not with IR or radar homing missiles.
I was reading some article some time back between a simultated war game between Isreal and US. The Isrealis had BVR munition and they raped their American counterparts from afar.
Also the new generation radars in aircrafts are multi functional. eg Zhuk in the Mig-29 can simultaneoulsy track 13 targets and the pilot can fire and forget 8 of them simultaneouly. Basically, the radar can track more targets than the number of missiles carried on the plane.
Yeah, a pilot will get warnings on his instruments that he is tracked and targeted, but with his radar on he has no where to hide with radar homing missiles unless he has an electronic jammer.
In short, BVR weapons are a very powerful weapon in any airforces inventory. Without BVR, the enemy forces will be sitting ducks without them even engaing your planes.
April 14th, 2002, 09:05 PM
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO RADAR
INTRODUCTION. The word "RADAR" is an acronym for Radio Detection and Ranging. As it was originally conceived, radio waves were used to detect the presence of a target and to determine its distance or range.
CHAPTER 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF RF RADIATION
INTRODUCTION. In order for a radar system to determine range, azimuth, elevation, or velocity data, it must transmit and receive electromagnetic radiation. This electromagnetic radiation is referred to as radio frequency (RF) radiation. RF transmissions have specific characteristics that determine the capabilities and limitations of a radar system to provide these target discriminants, based on an analysis of the characteristics of the target return. The frequency of transmitted RF energy affects the ability of a radar system to analyze target return, based on time, to determine target range. RF frequency also affects the ability of the transmitting antenna to focus RF energy into a narrow beam to provide azimuth and elevation information. The wavelength and frequency of the transmitted RF energy impact the propagation of the radar signal through the atmosphere. The polarization of the RF signal affects the amount of clutter the radar must contend with. The ability of a radar system to use the Doppler effect in analyzing the radar return impacts the velocity discrimination capability of the radar. These characteristics of RF radiation will be discussed in this chapter.
CHAPTER 3. RADAR SIGNAL CHARACTERISTICS
INTRODUCTION. Every radar produces a radio frequency (RF) signal with specific characteristics that differentiate it from all other signals and define its capabilities and limitations. Pulse width (pulse duration), pulse recurrence time (pulse recurrence interval), pulse recurrence frequency, and power are all radar signal characteristics determined by the radar transmitter. Listening time, rest time, and recovery time are radar receiver characteristics. An understanding of the terms used to describe these characteristics is critical to understanding radar operation.
CHAPTER 4. RADAR SYSTEM COMPONENTS
INTRODUCTION. The individual components of a radar determine the capabilities and limitations of a particular radar system. The characteristics of these components also determine the countermeasures that will be effective against a specific radar system. This chapter will discuss the components of a basic pulse radar, a continuous wave (CW) radar, a pulse Doppler radar, and a monopulse radar.
CHAPTER 5. RADAR PRINCIPLES
INTRODUCTION. The primary purpose of radar systems is to determine the range, azimuth, elevation, or velocity of a target. The ability of a radar system to determine and resolve these important target parameters depends on the characteristics of the transmitted radar signal. This chapter explains the relationship of radar frequency (RF), pulse recurrence frequency (PRF), pulse width (PW), and beamwidth to target detection and resolution.
CHAPTER 6. RADAR SCANS
INTRODUCTION. The method radar antennas employ to sample the environment is a critical design feature of the radar system. This method is often called the radar scan. The scan type selected for a particular radar system often decides the employment of that radar in an integrated air defense system (IADS). The process the radar antenna uses to search airspace for targets is called scanning or sweeping. This chapter will discuss circular, unidirectional, bidirectional, Helical, Raster, Palmer, and conical scans, and track-while-scan (TWS) radar systems.
CHAPTER 7. TARGET TRACKING
INTRODUCTION. A target tracking radar (TTR) is designed to provide all the necessary information to guide a missile or aim a gun to destroy an aircraft. Once a target has been detected, either by a dedicated search radar or by using an acquisition mode, the TTR is designed to provide accurate target range, azimuth, elevation, or velocity information to a fire control computer.
CHAPTER 8. MISSILE GUIDANCE TECHNIQUES INTRODUCTION. Once a target has been designated, acquired, and tracked by a radar system, the final stage in target engagement is to guide a missile or projectile to destroy the target. There are three basic requirements for successful missile guidance: (1) precise target tracking by a target tracking radar (TTR) or from an infrared (IR) tracker to provide target parameters (range, azimuth, elevation, velocity, etc.); (2) a method to track the position of the missile compared with the target; and (3) a fire control computer to generate missile guidance commands based on target and missile position. The missile guidance techniques employed by modern air-to-air and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems will be covered in this chapter. In addition, the target engagement techniques employed by antiaircraft artillery (AAA) systems will also be discussed. There are three distinct phases in any missile intercept: boost, mid-course, and terminal.
CHAPTER 9. INTRODUCTION TO RADAR JAMMING
INTRODUCTION. Radar jamming is the intentional radiation or reradiation of radio frequency (RF) signals to interfere with the operation of a radar by saturating its receiver with false targets or false target information. Radar jamming is one principal component of electronic combat (EC). Specifically, it is the electronic attack (EA) component of electronic warfare (EW). Radar jamming is designed to counter the radar systems that play a vital role in support of an enemy integrated air defense system (IADS). The primary purpose of radar jamming is to create confusion and deny critical information to negate the effectiveness of enemy radar systems. This chapter will introduce the two types of radar jamming, the three radar jamming employment options, and discuss the fundamental principles that determine the effectiveness of radar jamming.
CHAPTER 10. RADAR NOISE JAMMING
INTRODUCTION. A radar noise jamming system is designed to generate a disturbance in a radar receiver to delay or deny target detection. Since thermal noise is always present in the radar receiver, noise jamming attempts to mask the presence of targets by substantially adding to this noise level. Radar noise jamming can be employed by stand-off jamming (SOJ) assets, escort jamming assets, or as a self-protection jamming technique. Radar noise jamming usually employs high power jamming signals tuned to the frequency of the victim radar. This chapter will discuss the factors that determine the effectiveness of radar noise jamming, radar noise jamming generation, and the most common noise jamming techniques. These noise jamming techniques include barrage, spot, swept spot, cover pulse, and modulated noise jamming.
CHAPTER 11. DECEPTION JAMMING
INTRODUCTION. Deception jamming systems are designed to inject false information into a victim radar to deny critical information on target azimuth, range, velocity, or a combination of these parameters. To be effective, a deception jammer receives the victim radar signal, modifies this signal, and retransmits this altered signal back to the victim radar. Because these systems retransmit, or repeat, a replica of the victim's radar signal, deception jammers are known as repeater jammers. The retransmitted signal must match all victim radar signal characteristics including frequency, pulse recurrence frequency (PRF), pulse recurrence interval (PRI), pulse width, and scan rate. However, the deception jammer does not have to replicate the power of the victim radar system.
CHAPTER 12. CHAFF EMPLOYMENT
INTRODUCTION. Chaff was first used during World War II when the Royal Air Force, under the code name "Window," dropped bales of metallic foil during a night bombing raid in July 1943. The bales of foil were thrown from each bomber as it approached the target. The disruption of German AAA fire control and ground control intercept (GCI) radars rendered these systems almost totally ineffective. Based on this early success, chaff employment became a standard bomber tactic for the rest of the war.
CHAPTER 13. FLARE EMPLOYMENT
INTRODUCTION. Since their introduction in the 1950s, infrared (IR) missiles have been an increasing threat from both ground-based and airborne systems. The range, reliability, and effectiveness of IR missiles have been continuously updated and improved by advanced detector materials and computer technology. Since IR missiles are passive, they are relatively simple and inexpensive to produce. These characteristics have contributed to the proliferation of IR missiles in the combat arena. Nearly every aircraft flying in either the air-to-air or air-to-surface role, now carries an all-aspect IR missile. Additionally, every infantry unit down to the platoon level is equipped with shoulder-fired IR missiles. The primary countermeasure against IR missiles is the expendable IR countermeasure, or flare. This chapter will cover basic IR theory, flare characteristics, flare employment, and other IR countermeasures (IRCM).
CHAPTER 14. IR MISSILE FLARE REJECTION
INTRODUCTION. There are two important characteristics of infrared (IR) missiles that influence the effectiveness of self-protection flares. The first is the ability of the IR missile seeker to discriminate between the IR signature of the aircraft and the IR signature of background interference, especially clouds. The second is the flare rejection capability built into the missile seeker and the missile guidance section.
CHAPTER 15. RADAR ELECTRONIC PROTECTION (EP) TECHNIQUES
INTRODUCTION. Electronic warfare (EW) is defined as military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Nearly every military action, from command and control of an entire integrated air defense system (IADS) to precision guidance of an individual weapon, depends on effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Radar systems have become a vital element of nearly every military operation. Since these systems operate across the entire electromagnetic spectrum, much of the EW effort is concerned with countering radar systems. All of the jamming techniques discussed in Chapters 10 and 11 and the chaff employment options discussed in Chapter 12 are specifically designed to counter radar systems. These actions are classified as electronic attack (EA), which is a division under EW.
CHAPTER 16. RADAR WARNING RECEIVER (RWR) BASIC OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION. Radar surveillance and radar directed weapons represent the biggest threat to aircraft survival on the modern battlefield. The first step in countering these threat systems is to provide the pilot or crew with timely information on the signal environment. The radar warning receiver (RWR) is designed to provide this vital information to the pilot. The RWR system is an example of an electronic warfare support (ES) system. ES is a division under electronic warfare (EW). The primary purpose of an RWR system is to provide a depiction of the electronic order of battle (EOB) that can have an immediate impact on aircraft survival. Though the RWR system is complex, the basic operations of the various components is straightforward. This chapter will discuss the functions of the various components of a RWR system including the antennas, receiver/amplifiers, signal processor, emitter identification (EID) tables, RWR scope, RWR audio, and limitations to RWR systems.
CHAPTER 17. SELF-PROTECTION JAMMING SYSTEM OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION. Self-protection jamming systems are designed to counter surface-to-air (SAM), airborne interceptor (AI), and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) acquisition and target tracking radars. Self-protection jamming systems generate noise and deception jamming techniques to either deny threat system automatic tracking capability or generate sufficient tracking errors to prevent a successful engagement.
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